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INTRODUCTION

On July 22, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the
Act”), enacting what many consider to be the most sweeping changes
to the United States financial regulatory system since the Great Depression. One of the hallmarks of the Act was its creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (the “Bureau”), an independent agency housed within the Federal Reserve, designed to serve as a
watchdog for purchasers of consumer financial services. One of the
clearest descriptions of the Bureau’s task of “consumer protection”
can be gleaned from an anecdote by Elizabeth Warren, the conceiver
of the idea for an agency dedicated to consumer financial protection
and the Administration’s former “advisor” for the establishment of
the Bureau:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting
into flames and burning down your house. But it is possible to refinance
an existing home with a mortgage that has the same one-in-five chance of
putting the family out on the street—and the mortgage won’t even carry
a disclosure of that fact to the homeowner . . . . Why are consumers safe
when they purchase tangible consumer products with cash, but when
they sign up for routine financial products like mortgages and credit
1
cards they are left at the mercy of their creditors?

Put in these terms, it is difficult to imagine any politician arguing
against the intended objectives of the Bureau. Despite how much
consumer protection may sound like a goal worthy of bipartisan sup*

1
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port, however, the structure and mere existence of the Bureau have
been the subject of much partisan controversy. For example, since
the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Republicans in the House of Representatives have introduced at least four bills aimed at limiting the Bu2
reau’s powers, and numerous Republican Senators have threatened
3
to filibuster the appointment of a permanent Bureau director.
In response to this controversy, I seek in this Comment, as a preliminary matter, to clarify two points of apparent confusion among
Bureau opponents: (1) despite the objections directed at the Act for
endowing the Bureau with too much power and discretion, the Act is
within the bounds of the Supreme Court’s nondelegation doctrine;
and (2) despite the failure of President Obama to seek Senate confirmation for his appointment of Elizabeth Warren, the appointment
did satisfy the requirements of the Court’s Appointments Clause doctrine. Notwithstanding this defense of the Bureau, however, the
Comment ultimately seeks to establish that, despite the constitutional
shelter the Administration may have found under our sometimes
convoluted administrative law doctrines, the Act and the appointment of Warren raise significant questions as to whether the Administration is seriously interested in adhering to the spirit of the law rather than simply the letter of it.
Although hard to define, the “spirit of the law” is of fundamental
importance to a well-functioning government. Since no court can articulate a doctrine so detailed as to distinguish perfectly every violation of the law from every non-violation, the public must be able to
trust that its elected officials will endeavor to act in accordance with
the broader purposes of the law. A government that seeks loopholes
in the constitutional doctrines developed to regulate it will find itself
with insufficient credibility to fault private actors for similarly exploiting loopholes in the laws and regulations that they are subject to. It is
in this regard that criticism of the Bureau is justified, and future administrations have much to learn from.
I begin in Part II of this Comment by providing perspective into
the economic and political environment that led to the establishment
of the Bureau. In Part III, I describe the Court’s nondelegation doctrine and explain that while the Bureau may satisfy the requirements
of one version of the doctrine, formed from a survey of case out2
3

See infra note 23.
Ylan Q. Mui, GOP Senators Vow to Block CFPB Nominee, WASH. POST, May 5, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/gop-senators-vow-to-block-cfpbnominee/2011/05/05/AFG70f2F_story.html (describing Republican senators’ vow to
“block any nominee to lead the . . . Consumer Financial Protection Bureau”).
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comes, the Bureau in many ways seems to fail the requirements of a
second version, synthesized directly from statements made by various
justices in recent cases involving nondelegation issues. Finally, in
Part III, I describe the Court’s Appointment’s Clause doctrine and
apply it to the appointment of Elizabeth Warren, concluding that the
undefined nature of the powers granted to Warren during her tenure
with the Bureau is itself indicative of the Administration’s willingness
to stray from the spirit of the law, and arguing for an interpretation
of the Act that would have restricted these powers to mostly administrative functions.
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS & THE ENACTMENT OF DODD-FRANK
An analysis of the Bureau and its powers would be incomplete
without an explanation of the economic and political events that led
to its creation. As a context for understanding the importance of the
“spirit of the law,” I also seek to highlight in this section the consequences that can occur when the private sector fails to adhere to it.
During the final three months of 2007, growth of U.S. gross domestic product decreased on a quarterly basis for the first time since
4
2001. The effects of the financial crisis correlating with this recession have been felt by nearly every American household and explana5
tions for its timing have been the subject of much scholarly writing.
Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the average American home in6
creased by 124%. While during the period from 1981 to 2001 the
national median home price ranged between 2.9 to 3.1 times median
household income, in 2004 this ratio rose to 4.0 and by 2006 it had
7
climbed as high as 4.6. The risk associated with reliance on these increases in property value spread from the confines of the balance
4

5

6
7

U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT:
PERCENT CHANGE FROM PRECEDING PERIOD (2011), available at http://www.bea.gov/
national/xls/gdpchg.xls.
For background information on the subject, please see the following materials: JOHN B.
FOSTER & FRED MAGDOFF, THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
(2009); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL:
AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); BARRY
WITHOLTZ WITH AARON TISK, BAILOUT NATION, WITH NEW POST-CRISIS UPDATE: HOW
GREED AND EASY MONEY CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY
(2009).
CSI: Credit Crunch, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/
9972489.
Ben Steverman & David Bogoslaw, The Financial Crisis Blame Game, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct.
18, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/print/investor/content/oct2008/pi20081017_
950382.htm.
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sheets of depository institutions to that of the broader macroeconomy, as mortgage-backed securities became increasingly popular within the financial services industry. As was inevitable, the bubble eventually burst and by 2008 housing prices had declined by over 20%
8
from their mid-2006 peak. The resulting havoc was felt in economic,
social, and political terms.
During 2007, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly
9
1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006, and by 2008 this
10
number increased to 2.3 million. By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S.
11
mortgages outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure,
12
and by September 2009, this number had risen to 14.4%. In 2009,
the IMF calculated that major U.S. and European banks had lost
more than $1 trillion on toxic assets and bad loans from January 2007
to September 2009 and estimated that the losses would top
13
$2.8 trillion for the period from 2007–2010. During this period,
numerous institutions of systemic importance to the U.S. economy
declared bankruptcy, were acquired under duress, or were rescued by
the government—including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
14
Lynch, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, and AIG.
8

9

10

11

12

13

14



Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, National Trend of Home Price Declines Continues
Through the Third Quarter of 2008 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Nov. 25, 2008), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/
CSHomePrice_Release_112555.pdf.
Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007 (Jan. 29,
2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosureactivity-increases-75-percent-in-2007-3604?accnt=64847.
Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent in 2008 (Jan. 15,
2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/foreclosure-activityincreases-81-percent-in-2008-4551?accnt=64847.
Late 2000s Financial Crisis, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Late2000s_financial_crisis (last visited Sept. 9, 2011) (citing Press Release, Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Sept. 5, 2008), available at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/
64769.htm).
Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Delinquencies Continue to Climb in Latest MBA
National Delinquency Survey (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://www.mbaa.org/
NewsandMedia/PressCenter/71112.htm.
David Cutler, Steve Slater & Elinor Comlay, Factbox–U.S., European Bank Writedowns, Credit
Losses, REUTERS, (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/idCNL55415562009
1105.
Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Citigroup Buys Bank Operations of Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/business/30bank.html; The Fed
Bails
Out
AIG,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Sept
16,
2008),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/sep2008/db20080916_387203.
htm?chan=top+news_top+news+index+-+temp_top+story (reporting the “emergency
loan” extended to AIG by the government); Christopher Scinta & Tiffany Kary, WaMu
Files for Bankruptcy Following FDIC Seizure (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2008),
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In October 2008, in an attempt to prevent what was perceived to
be the next “Great Depression,” President Bush signed into law the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, authorizing the Secretary of
the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets
15
and make capital injections into the banking system. At the same
time, the Federal Reserve began using its powers to make emergency
loans to companies ranging from Bank of America and Goldman
16
Sachs to non-financial institutions like Verizon and McDonalds.
Perhaps the most significant statistic, however, was the change in the
nation’s unemployment rate: rising from 4.7% in September of 2007,
17
to a high of 10.1% in October of 2009.
The economy weighed heavily on the minds of voters in the 2008
election, with 62% citing it as their top issue in deciding which can18
didate to cast their ballot for. The election brought a Democratic
majority in both houses of Congress, and ushered in Democratic nominee Barack Obama as the new President. It is with this backdrop
that Dodd-Frank was enacted. After numerous measures designed to
help stabilize the economy, including a continuation of the Trouble
Assets Relief Program (“TARP”) established during the Bush Administration, a stimulus package estimated at the time to cost $825 billion, and a “bailout” of the auto industry, the Administration shifted
focus to putting in place regulations to ensure that a similar economic precipice would never again be reached.
Economists and politicians have disagreed on what the precise
causes of the crisis were, but it is clear that the surge in subprime

15

16

17

18

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aG.D1cUCF5zU (reporting Washington Mutual’s bankruptcy filing); Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas Jr.,
J.P. Morgan Acts to Buy Bear Stearns at Huge Discount, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/business/16cnd-bear.html; Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all
(reporting Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing and Bank of America’s purchase of Merill
Lynch).
See Economic Rescue Swiftly Signed Into Law, AFP, Oct. 3, 2008, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5h40yrrEcqeJEeVRgcrDXB7egDo2A (detailing the 700-billion-dollar Wall
Street bailout).
See Luca Di Leo & Maya Jackson Randall, Fed Data Show Firms on the Brink, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870459480457564874094
8074042.html (“Apart from banks, the Fed also bought short-term debt from McDonalds
Corp., Verizon Communications, Inc., Harley-Davidson Inc., and state-owned Korea Development Bank.”).
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2011), available at http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet?series_id=LNS14000000.
David P. Kuhn, Exit Polls: Economy Top Issue, POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1108/15270.html.
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loans was at the heart of it. Although some have placed primary
blame for the spread of such loans on government enterprises like
19
20
Fannie Mae or on the Federal Reserve, it is difficult to dispute that
predatory lending by banks and brokers played a large role in exacerbating it. Evidence of this included charges against Countrywide
Home Loans that ended up resulting in what was the largest predato21
ry lending settlement in U.S. history—$8.4 billion. In the words of
then-California Attorney General Jerry Brown, Countrywide had
22
“turned the American dream into a nightmare.” With this type of
fraud in mind, Bureau proponents saw the establishment of a consumer financial protection agency as a critical piece of any legislation
23
overhauling the financial system. Finally, on July 22, 2010, following
a Senate vote on the Act attracting the support of only three Republicans, Dodd-Frank was signed into law and the Bureau was estab24
lished.
While this recap of the financial crisis is on one hand intended to
provide the reader with an understanding of the Administration’s
reasons for creating the Bureau and endowing it with the controversial range of powers that will be discussed in the following section, it
also serves as an example of what can occur when the application of
the law is divorced from the spirit of it. As mentioned above, one

19

20

21

22
23

24

See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, What Got Us Here?, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC
POLICY RESEARCH (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.aei.org/article/29047 (stating that “the
most persuasive case for the cause of the financial crisis is the U.S. government itself” and
claiming that “with [the] financial incentives for homeowners, banks and other mortgage
lenders--easy lending terms and a ready market for mortgages through Fannie [Mae] and
Freddie [Mac]--a housing bubble was inevitable”).
See, e.g., John B. Taylor, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Feb. 9, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123414310280561945.html
(“[m]onetary excesses were the main cause of the boom. The Fed held its target interest
rate, especially in 2003-2005, well below known monetary guidelines that say what good
policy should be based on historical experience. Keeping interest rates on the track that
worked well in the past two decades, rather than keeping rates so low, would have prevented the boom and the bust.”).
See Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
5, 2008, at B1 (stating that Countrywide Financial agreed to the “largest program ever to
modify home loans”).
Id.
See, e.g., U.S. Rep. Maxine Waters, Statement on the Need for a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency, HOUSE.GOV (Jul. 20, 2009), http://waters.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.
aspx?DocumentID=140725 (“Another reason we need a consumer financial protection
agency is to protect consumers from complicated products and hidden and predatory
fees.”).
Brian Montopoli, Obama Signs Sweeping Financial Reform Into Law, CBS NEWS (July 21,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20011201-503544.html (reporting the
signing of the Act and the limited Republican support for it).
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target of blame for the crisis were the banks and other financial institutions that originated the complex set of instruments that have been
seen as its cause. While some institutions like Countrywide have been
charged with actual violations of the law, a much broader array have
25
been accused of exploiting holes in the financial regulatory scheme.
Those who might trivialize the idea of the “spirit of the law” should
keep in mind while reading the following sections that if as a society
we cannot expect our government to adhere to anything greater than
the “letter of the law,” certainly we can not expect private corporations to do so either.
III. THE BUREAU & THE NON-DELEGATION PRINCIPLE
Among the objections levied against Dodd-Frank are complaints
that the Bureau it has created is too large, powerful, and immune
from oversight, and has been granted too much of a free reign to
write and enforce rules without specific Congressional guidance. In
fact, since Dodd-Frank’s enactment, Republicans in the House of
Representatives have introduced at least four bills aimed at altering
26
the Bureau’s powers and structure. Exemplary of its critics is Senator Richard Shelby, who has complained that “the bill has delegated
to bureaucrats the authority to devise dozens, if not hundreds, of new
rules for our financial system . . . provid[ing] no specific guidance in
any number of areas, including . . . consumer protection and systemic

25

26

See Vigal V. Acharya et al., Market Failures and Regulatory Failures: Lessons From Past and
Present Financial Crises 12 (ADBI Working Paper Series No. 264, 2011), available at
http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.02.08.wp264.market.regulatory.failures.lessons.gfc.pdf
(“In the crisis of 2007–2009, financial firms managed to shift risk by exploiting loopholes
in regulatory capital requirements to take an undercapitalized, US$2- to 3-trillion, highly
leveraged, one-way asymmetric bet on the economy, particlarly tied to residential real estate but also to commercial real estate and other consumer credit exposures.”); Jeremy C.
Stein, Securitization, Shadow Banking, and Financial Fragility 6 (May 2010) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/stein/files/
SecuritizationShadowBankingAndFragilityRevised.pdf (“[B]anks were exploiting a regulatory loophole: if they held the loans directly on their balance sheets, they faced a regulatory capital requirement . . . but if the loans were securitized and parked in an offbalance-sheet vehicle . . . the regulatory capital requirement was much reduced.”).
See, e.g., H.R. 1121, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending Dodd-Frank so as to “replace the Director of the Bureau . . . with a five person Commission”); H.R. 1315, 112th Cong. (2011)
(amending Dodd-Frank so as to “strengthen the review authority of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council of regulations issued by the Bureau; H.R. 1640, 112th Cong. (2011)
(amending Dodd-Frank so as to “bring the Bureau . . . into the regular appropriations
process . . . ”); H.R. 1667, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending Dodd-Frank so as “postpone
the date for the transfer of functions to the Bureau . . . if the Bureau does not yet have a
Director in place”).
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27

risk.” Shelby has alleged that “[i]n many instances, Dodd-Frank has
outsourced this [Banking] [C]ommittee’s responsibilities to un28
elected bureaucrats.” Similarly, upon reviewing the initial proposal
by Senator Christopher Dodd for the legislation creating the Bureau,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce complained that it “[did not] like
the vagueness that Dodd’s proposal uses in saying that the Bureau
could enforce actions against firms who engage in ‘abusive’ practic29
es,” as it “wonders what ‘abusive’ means.” In analyzing the merits of
these types of complaints, a natural starting point is determining
whether the Bureau is in compliance with the constitutional doctrine
designed to quell such worries—the nondelegation principle.
In Part A of this section, I provide an overview of the principle
and its history, concluding that today there are two versions of the
doctrine, one formed from a survey of case outcomes, and the second
synthesized directly from statements made by various justices in recent cases involving nondelegation issues. In Part B, I provide an
overview of the Bureau’s structure and powers, as relevant to the
nondelegation analysis. Finally, in Part C, I argue that while it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would strike down the Bureau as unconstitutional, there are several features of the Bureau that seem to
violate the spirit of the nondelegation principle.
A. The Doctrine and its History
While the nondelegation principle can be explained as merely a
facet of the broader idea of the separation of powers, its roots can be
more specifically traced back to John Locke, who famously wrote in
his Second Treatise of Government that
the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other
hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have
it cannot pass it over to others. . . . [T]he power of legislative . . . can be
no other than . . . to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and
30
place it in the other hands.

25

28
29

30

Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of
Richard Shelby, U.S. Senate, Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs).
Id.
David Indiviglio, Chamber Stands Against Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/03/
chamber-stands-against-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/37563.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141, at 81 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., The Liberal Art Press, Inc., 1952) (1690).
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One of the earliest articulations of this principle by the Supreme
Court can be found in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, where
Chief Justice Taft upheld Congress’s delegation of power to the President through the Tariff Act of 1922 to adjust the duties imposed on
31
imports by the Act. Specifically, Taft stated what has come to be
known as the “intelligible principle” test, writing that “[i]f Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform,
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
32
power.” Taft found that the Tariff Act of 1922 contained such an
intelligible principle since it mandated that import tariffs should
“equal the difference between the cost of producing [the articles] in
a foreign country . . . and the cost of producing and selling like or
33
similar articles in the United States.”
Despite the deep roots of this principle, however, the Supreme
Court has applied it only two times as a basis for invalidating acts of
34
Congress—in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
35
Corp. v. United States. These two cases, both decided during a period
of major reform of the role of government in American society,
sparked heavy criticism by the Roosevelt Administration and academics, who accused the Court of “threatening to defeat the efforts of our
political democracy to use government as an instrumentality for the
36
effective control of our national economy.” It soon became clear,
however, that the Court would abandon their fight against such Congressional delegation. Since Schechter, the Court has yet to strike
down any other statute on the basis of the nondelegation principle,
and its standards for what type of directives can constitute an “intelligible principle” have been greatly diluted. The Court, for example,
has upheld the authority of the SEC to pass rules to ensure that the
structures of holding company systems are not “unduly or unnecessarily complicate[d]” and do not “unfairly or inequitably distribute vot37
ing power among security holders,” and it has approved standards as
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412–13 (1928) (affirming the
constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1922).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 404.
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 392 (1935) (finding the National Industrial Recovery Act’s delegation of legislative power as void).
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 500 (1935) (holding
that “Congress has set up no intelligible policies to govern the President”).
James Hart, Limits of Legislative Delegation, 221 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 87
(1942).
Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
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vague as “generally fair and equitable and . . . effectuat[ing] the pur38
poses of [an] Act” and regulating in the “public interest, conveni39
ence, or necessity.”
This early disablement of the doctrine, however, should not be
confused with an end of its vitality. In a number of relatively recent
decisions, various members of the Court have made sure to stress the
continued importance of the nondelegation principle and describe
circumstances under which its revival could come about. In Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, the Court
upheld Congress’ delegation of power to the Secretary of Labor to
promulgate occupational safety and health standards “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
40
places of employment.” The Act directed the Secretary, in promulgating standards, to “set the standard which most adequately assures,
to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will suffer material im41
pairment of health . . . .” Justice Rehnquist, concurring in judgment
but finding the delegation to be impermissible, stated that “the legislative history contains nothing to indicate that the language ‘to the
extent feasible’ does anything other than render what had been a
42
clear . . . standard largely, if not entirely, precatory.” Rehnquist described what he saw as the three main functions of the nondelegation
doctrine: (1) ensuring “to the extent consistent with orderly government administration that important choices of social policy are
made by Congress;” (2) guaranteeing that Congress provides the recipient of any delegated authority “an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide
the exercise of the delegated discretion;” and (3) ensuring that
“courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative
discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable stan43
dards.” Here, Rehnquist found that Congress was faced with a policy choice between “balancing statistical lives and industrial resources”
or “elevat[ing] human life above all concerns save massive dislocation
in an affected industry” and recognizing the difficulty of the choice
44
improperly deferred to the executive.

38
39

40
41
42
43
44

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944).
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943) (upholding the FCC’s
power to regulate airwaves); see also New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S.
12, 24–25 (1932) (upholding the ICC’s power to approve railroad consolidations).
448 U.S. 607, 615 (1980).
Id. at 612.
Id. at 681–82 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 685–86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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Similar guidance is found in Mistretta v. United States, which concerned the authority of the newly created United States Sentencing
45
Commission to promulgate federal sentencing guidelines. The majority upheld the authority and stated that
[o]nly if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s action, so that it would be impossible in a
proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been
obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effect46
ing its declared purpose.

In dissent, Justice Scalia commented that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a principle more essential to democratic government than that
47
upon which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded.”
Scalia stressed that given that intelligible principles as vague as “public interest” standards had survived judicial scrutiny, the critical question was whether the delegated law-making power in question was
“ancillary” to the inherent constitutional authority of the government
48
branch entrusted with the power. Scalia found that “[t]he lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission [was] completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or adjudica49
tion of private rights under the law,” and thus was impermissible.
Finally, the most recent case providing guidance as to what is left
of the nondelegation doctrine is Whitman v. American Trucking
50
Ass’ns. In the case below, the D.C. Circuit had ruled that a provision
of the Clear Air Act lacked sufficiently determinate criteria for guiding the agency’s discretion and remanded the case to the EPA to construe the Act for an intelligible principle by which to govern its deci51
sions. The Court was decisive in reversing the D.C. Circuit, but did
reiterate some points made in earlier decisions regarding features of
the doctrine. Particularly relevant was the statement by Justice Scalia
that although “even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never
demanded . . . that statutes provide ‘determinate criterion’ for saying
45

46
47
48

49
50
51

488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“Mistretta moved to have the promulgated Guidelines ruled
unconstitutional on the grounds that . . . Congress delegated excessive authority to the
[Sentencing] Commission to structure the guidelines.”).
Id. at 379 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 417–18 (“The whole theory of lawful congressional ‘delegation’ is . . . that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action . . . .”).
Id. at 420.
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, 531 U.S.
457 (2001) (“[W]e are remanding to EPA to formulate adequate decision criteria . . . .”).
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‘how much [of the regulated harm] is too much,’” that “the degree of
agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of
52
the power congressionally conferred.”
Synthesizing the above cases yields the conclusion that today there
53
are two versions of the nondelegation doctrine. First, there is a version based on some of the actual language used by various Justices in
recent nondelegation cases, including those discussed above. Under
this version, a determination of the validity of Congressional delegation of power to an agency seems to require a multi-step inquiry into
the magnitude of the agency’s powers, the scope of its jurisdiction,
and the relation of its rule-making authority to its enforcement and
adjudicatory powers. This version seems to revolve more directly
around the spirit of that original statement of the doctrine by John
Locke, and ultimately seeks to determine the range of discretion
available to an agency implementing Congressional decisions regarding issues of national policy. Only if the delegation is so great such
that it would be the agency rather than the legislature doing the policy-setting would this version of the doctrine find a constitutional
problem.
Then there is the second version of the doctrine, this one based
more directly on a survey of case outcomes. Under this version, identifying how much discretion is too much is deemed to be an impossible task, and so the Court is unlikely to strike a statute down as unconstitutional if it can identify even some vague standard to call an
54
“intelligible principle.” It is this second version of the doctrine that

52

53

54

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (alteration in original). As an illustrative example, Scalia wrote
that “[w]hile Congress need not provide any direction to the EPA regarding the manner
in which it is to define ‘country elevators,’ which are to be exempt from new-stationarysource regulations governing grain elevators, it must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy.” Id.
For alternative views of what the nondelegation is or should be see MARTIN H. REDISH,
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 136 (1995) (analyzing the important role
the Constitution plays in dictating the structure of our government, and suggesting that
courts should “demand as the prerequisite for legislative action some meaningful level of
normative political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate
to judge its representatives”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231, 1239 (1994) (arguing that the post-New Deal administrative
state is unconstitutional and that “the core of the Constitution’s nondelegation principle
can be expressed as follows: Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them”).
In attempting to answer why the nondelegation doctrine has had “so little a constraining
effect” if it is “so fundamental a principle to our constitutional order,” some have argued
that judges’ “rhetorical enthusiasm for the nondelegation doctrine was overmatched by
their reluctance to confront the legislature.” Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi,
Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 259–60 (2010).
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is more useful in determining how the Court would rule on the constitutionality of the Bureau’s power.
B. Overview of the Bureau and its Powers
With the key factors of the nondelegation doctrine in mind, in
this section I provide an overview of the Bureau and the Act, focusing
on features relevant to the nondelegation inquiry, including: identifying the scope of its jurisdiction and magnitude of its powers; discussing the relation of its rulemaking authority to its enforcement
powers; and describing the range of discretion available to it in
promulgating rules.
The Bureau has authority to regulate any person who engages in
offering or providing a “consumer financial product or service,” and
55
any affiliate service provider of such a person. Consumer financial
products and services are defined to include, among other things, financial products or services provided for use by consumers primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes, and certain financial
products or services offered in connection with a consumer financial
56
product.
The Act provides a laundry list of such products and services, including: (1) extending credit and servicing loans; (2) extending or
brokering certain leases of personal or real property; (3) providing
real estate settlement services; (4) engaging in deposit-taking activities; (5) selling payment instruments; (6) providing check cashing or
collection services; and (7) providing certain financial advisory ser57
vices. If the Bureau does not find this list sufficiently comprehensive, it also has the authority to add additional products or services
58
through regulation. In lay terms, this means that the Bureau has
rule-making authority over a vast swath of the U.S. financial services
industry, and will be able to regulate financial products ranging from
credit cards to mortgages. The scope of its jurisdiction might, in fact,
be better understood by the short list of institutions exempt from its
authority, including: certain retailers offering credit in connection
with the sale of nonfinancial goods or services, real estate brokerage
59
services, lawyers, insurance companies, and auto dealers.

55
56
57
58
59

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1002(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
Id. at § 1002(5)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1956 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
Id. at § 1002(15)(A), 124 Stat at 1957–58 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
Id. at § 1002(15)(A)(xi), 124 Stat, at 1959 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5481).
Id. at §§ 1027, 1029, 124 Stat. at 1995–2006 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5517, 5519).
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In describing the relation of its rulemaking authority to its enforcement power, the Act divides its jurisdiction into three categories:
(1) “very large” depository institutions, (2) “other” depository institutions, and (3) nondepository institutions. The “very large” depository
institution category includes insured banks, savings associations, and
60
credit unions with total assets of more than $10 billion. In regards
to these institutions, the Bureau has exclusive authority to require reports and conduct examinations in connection with the enforcement
of consumer financial protection laws, and the primary authority to
61
enforce such laws. The “other” depository institutions category includes insured banks, savings associations, and credit unions with to62
tal assets of less than $10 billion. What is critically different for this
category of institutions, however, is that it is the individual institutions’ prudential banking regulators rather than the Bureau that are
63
authorized to enforce the consumer protection laws against them.
Thus, while the Bureau may promulgate rules affecting such institutions, it does not actually have authority to enforce the rules against
the institutions. Finally, the nondepository institutions category includes a range of other institutions providing consumer financial
products or services. The Bureau must consult with the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) prior to issuing rules to define persons
covered under this category, and retains, in large part, exclusive
64
rulemaking and enforcement authority against the institutions.
The Act contains two sections that provide insight as to the degree
of discretion available to the Bureau when promulgating rules.
Broadly speaking, there are two sets of laws that provide the Bureau
with the authority to promulgate rules: (1) consumer protection laws
in existence prior to the to the Act, the enforcement of which will be
transferred to the Bureau from other agencies; and (2) consumer
protection laws put in place by the Act, the enforcement of which are
assigned directly to the Bureau. Subtitle B, titled “General Powers of
the Bureau” deals broadly with both sets of these laws and authorizes
the Bureau to “administer and carry out the purposes and objectives
of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions the65
reof.” Thus, in addition to any guiding statements contained in the
Act itself, the Bureau must also take into account the purposes of the
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at § 1025(a), 124 Stat. at 1990 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515).
Id. at § 1025(b)(1), (c), 124 Stat. at 1990–91 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5515).
Id. at § 1026(a), 124 Stat. at 1993 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516).
Id. at § 1026(d), 124 Stat. at 1994 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5516).
Id. at § 1024(c)(3), 124 Stat. 1987 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5514).
Id. at § 1022(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
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various consumer protection laws that proposed rules seek to aid the
enforcement of.
Although it is plausible that this standard in and of itself could be
sufficient to satisfy the loose “intelligible principle” test, the section
elaborates much further. Section 1021(b) lists five objectives of the
Bureau, including ensuring (1) consumers are provided with timely
and understandable information to make responsible decisions about
financial transactions; (2) consumers are protected from unfair deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination; (3)
outdated, unnecessary or unduly burdensome regulations are regularly identified and addressed in order to reduce unwarranted regulatory burdens; (4) Federal consumer financial law is enforced consistently without regard to the status of a person as a depository
institution, in order to promote fair competition; and (5) markets for
consumer financial products and services operate transparently and
66
efficiently to facilitate access and innovation.
In addition to these five objectives, 1022(b)(2) also proscribes
“standards for rulemaking,” including, among other things that: (1)
the Bureau shall consider the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access
to consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule;
and (2) the Bureau shall consult with other appropriate agencies regarding consistency with prudential, market, or systemic objectives
67
administered by such agencies. The Bureau is also allowed to pass
rules to exempt any class of covered persons, service providers, or
consumer financial products from any provision as it determines “necessary or appropriate to carry out . . . [its] purposes or objectives,”
taking into consideration: (1) the total assets of the class of covered
persons; (2) the volume of transactions involving consumer financial
products or services in which the class of covered person engages;
and (3) existing provisions of law applicable to the consumer financial product or services and the extent to which such provisions pro68
vide consumers with adequate protections.
Subsection C of the Act, titled “Specific Powers of the Bureau,”
deals more narrowly with laws created by the Act and assigned directly to the Bureau for enforcement, including for example, Section
1036, which makes it unlawful for any covered person to, among other things, “engage in any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or prac-

66
67
68

Id. at § 1021(b)(1)–(5), 124 Stat. at 1979 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511).
Id. at § 1022(b)(2)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
Id. at § 1022(b)(3)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5512).
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69

tice.” Section 1031(a) authorizes the Bureau to enforce this law,
and Section 1031(b) authorizes it to prescribe rules to identify acts or
70
practices as unfair, deceptive or abusive.
The Bureau can declare an act or practice “unfair” only if it has a
“reasonable basis” to conclude that it is “likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoided by consumers” and
“such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits
71
to consumers or to competition.” The Bureau is also allowed to
consider “established public policies” as evidence of unfairness,
72
though not as a primary basis for promulgating a rule.
The Bureau can declare an act or practice “abusive” only if it “materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term
or condition of a consumer financial product” or takes unreasonable
advantage of (1) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or services;
(2) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or service;
or (3) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person
73
to act in the interests of the consumer. With the above powers of
the Bureau in mind, the following section will analyze how they stand
up to the requirements of the nondelegation doctrine.
C. Application of the Doctrine to the Bureau
Returning to the two versions of the nondelegation doctrine
summarized previously, it seems clear that the guidance provided by
the Act is sufficiently determinate to satisfy the requirement of the
second version of the doctrine, the “intelligible principle” test. The
guidance is at least as specific as that in other statutes upheld by the
Court in previous cases, and any court reviewing the authority of the
Bureau to promulgate a particular rule will be able to cross-reference
the Bureau’s justification of it with the five objectives of the Bureau
made explicit by the Act, the various standards of rulemaking contained in it, and the legislative purpose of the particular consumer
protection law the rule is designed to help enforce.
What is more debatable, however, is the adherence of the Bureau
with the first described version of the doctrine and the spirit of the
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at § 1036(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 2010 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5536).
Id. at § 1031(a), (b), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
Id. at § 1031(c)(1)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
Id. at § 1031(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
Id. at § 1031(d)(1), (2), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531).
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original nondelegation principle. Take for example, the abovediscussed “standard for rulemaking” requiring the Bureau to “consider
the potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered persons,
including the potential reduction of access . . . to consumer financial
74
products or services.” This statement seems to be a clear example of
Congressional avoidance of a difficult policy choice, much like that
identified by Justice Rehnquist in American Petroleum Institute. If Congress intended that the Bureau balance costs and benefits, it would
have used language more like that used in §1031(c)(1)(A), which in
defining “fairness” calls for a determination of whether “substantial
75
injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers.”
While the exercise of cost-benefit analysis itself has been the subject
76
of much criticism, Congress stops short of even going this far, refusing to decide whether consumer protection is even theoretically an
important enough goal to justify disproportionate costs to lenders.
This raises the question as to under which circumstances a reviewing
court will consider the Bureau to have adequately “considered” costs
and benefits. Can a rule be promulgated if the Bureau concedes that
costs exceed benefits? In my view, a “consideration” of costs and
benefits means that the Bureau may pass a rule so long as costs do
not grossly outweigh benefits; this certainly does not seem to be the
type of guidance that would even remotely be of comfort to John
Locke.
Another example of the Administration skirting the boundaries of
the doctrine is the Act’s special treatment of “other” depository institutions. As stated earlier, although the Bureau has the authority to
promulgate rules that are applicable to these institutions, it does not
have any authority to enforce such rules against them. It would be
74
75
76

Id. at § 1022(b)(2)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 1980 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5512) (emphasis
added).
Id. at § 1031(c)(1)(A), (B), 124 Stat. at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (emphasis added).
One of the basic criticisms of cost-benefit analysis is the difficulty of incommensurability,
occurring when “relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing
violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796
(1994). For example, it is not entirely straightforward as to how to compare reduction in
access to credit for consumers to fungible costs borne on a bank to comply with a Bureau
rule. Critics also point to the fact that in quantifying the value of non-market goods, it is
difficult to obtain “objective data on individual preferences.” Don B. Hardin, Jr., Why
Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (And Some Answers) About The Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 1135, 1165 (2008). For example, some have contended that “the costs of a policy
change are often far easier to quantify than its benefits,” and that as a result, policy decisions in such areas tend to “result[] in a bias in favor of the status quo.” Robert H. Frank,
Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 928 (2000).
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one thing if these institutions comprised a small portion of the Bureau’s overall jurisdiction, but the fact that they comprise such a large
percentage of it renders it quite another. Banks with assets less than
$10 billion, the amount large enough to put them in the “very large”
category over which the Bureau has enforcement authority, comprise
77
98.7% of the roster of FDIC-insured institutions. Certainly, this is
not quite what Scalia alluded to in Mistretta when he said that the
lawmaking function of the Sentencing Commission was “completely
78
divorced” from its responsibility for execution of the law, but it is
certainly reminiscent of it. If rulemaking authority is meant to be ancillary to and in aid of enforcement authority, why is it that the Bureau’s rules affect so many more institutions than the Bureau has
power to enforce them against? Why not allow the Bureau to promulgate rules that account for whatever special situation small depository institutions present? The answer to this question is simple:
community banks were in a much better position to influence politicians than the megabanks which, accurately or not, were considered
more responsible for causing the crisis. Regardless of the reasoning
for the provision, however, its implications are certainly worthy of
criticism.
Perhaps even more troubling than these nondelegation concerns
are related worries about the insulation of the Bureau from oversight.
Most notable among these is the mechanism by which the Bureau is
funded. Although most agencies rely on Congressional appropriations for fulfilling their budget, the Bureau is instead funded directly
by the Federal Reserve, with a specific provision dictating that its
funds “shall not be subject to review by the Committees on Appropri79
ations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.” In the age
of the filibuster, where achieving the sixty vote supermajority that is
often required to pass a resolution overruling or preempting an
agency rule is very difficult, appropriations threats are a common way
of facilitating Congressional oversight of agencies. On the other
hand, Bureau proponents are correct in pointing out that the Bureau
has less budgetary independence than any other federal bank regula-

77

78
79

Banking Giants Control 90% of Industry Assets, PROBLEM BANK LIST (Sept. 6, 2010),
http://problembanklist.com/banking-giants-control-of-industry-assets-0189/. The counterpoint to this is that such “very large” institutions with assets over $10 billion control
78% of industry assets. Id.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 420 (1989).
Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1975 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5497).
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80

tor.
In particular, the OCC, FDIC, and OTS can increase their
budgets by simply increasing their assessments on banks, and the
81
Federal Reserve can do so by simply printing money. It is not clear,
however, whether this comparison is fair. In particular, the Bureau is
in many ways more similar to an appropriations-funded agency such
as the SEC than the banking regulators, whose primary task is to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system.
A similar concern is the inconspicuous exemption of the Bureau
82
from the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”). The PRA dictates that
all agencies obtain approval from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) before distributing forms that impose an in83
formation collection burden on the general public.
As such, it
serves as a mechanism for the executive branch to oversee even independent agencies. The PRA does contain an exemption, however,
whereby an independent agency “administered by 2 or more mem84
bers” may void any relevant disapproval of its authority. Since the
Bureau is administered by a single Director and not “2 or more
members,” it would appear that this exemption would not be applicable to it. The Act, however, amends the PRA and carves out a specific exemption for the Bureau, stating that rules or orders prescribed
or proposed by the Director shall be treated “on the same terms and
conditions as apply to . . . [those] proposed by the Board of Gover85
nors of the Federal Reserve System.” The Board of Governors, however, is a multimember body, and as such, it does have the power to
void OIRA disapproval. Treating the Bureau the same way would
86
imply that the Bureau’s single Director would also have this power.
The fact that the Bureau is administered by a single Director as
opposed to a multimember commission is itself an issue of concern.
Although other agencies with similarly broad powers, such as the
SEC, are administered by multimember commissions that have limits
80

81
82
83

84
85
86

Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of Adam J. Levitin, Assoc. Professor of Law, Georgetown University), available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040611levitin.pdf.
Id.
44 U.S.C. § 3501-49 (2006).
44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(2) (2006) (providing that an agency shall not conduct or sponsor the
collection of information unless “the [OIRA] Director has approved the proposed collection of information or approval has been inferred, under the provisions of this section”).
Id. § 3507(f)(1).
Dodd-Frank Act § 1100D(c), 124 Stat. 2111 (to be codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3502).
CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: REGULATIONS TO BE ISSUED BY THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 26 (2010).

290

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:1

on the maximum number of appointees from a single political par87
ty, there is no similar mechanism to ensure that opposing ideological views are represented at the highest level of Bureau decisionmaking. The Chamber of Commerce has offered four reasons for its
support of H.R. 1121, which would replace the director with a fivemember commission: (1) “[c]onform[ing] the Bureau to other independent agencies”; (2) “ensur[ing] better, impartial decisionmaking”; (3) “minimiz[ing] risk of regulatory capture”; and (4) “en88
sur[ing] continuity and stability.” It seems doubtful that the supposedly more streamlined and efficient decision-making made possible
89
by having a single Director is a sufficient justification for these concerns.
In sum, while it appears that the Bureau is indeed within the
bounds of that version of the nondelegation doctrine applied in practice by the Court, there are numerous provisions of the Act that seem
to conflict squarely with the spirit of the nondelegation principle.
One justification for this could perhaps be the fact that the delegation of such discretion is the small price that must be paid to avoid
the even greater administrative overreach that occurred during the
financial crisis. In particular, it is arguable that the expansive use by
90
the Federal Reserve of its discount window and the enactment of
87
88

89

90



No more than three of the five members of the Securities and Exchange Commission
may be from the same political party. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. (2011)
(statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce), available at http://financialservices.
house.gov/media/pdf/040611sharp.pdf.
See Legislative Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Assoc. Professor of Law, Georgetown University),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040611levitin.pdf (“This model enhances accountability and enables streamlined, decisive leadership and decisionmaking.”).
Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act provides that “[i]n unusual and exigent circumstances,” the Board of Governors can authorize any Federal Reserve bank to discount for
any corporation “notes, drafts, and bills of exchange [when] . . . indorsed or otherwise
secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank” so long as “before discounting . . . the Federal reserve bank . . . obtain[s] evidence that such . . . corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.” 12
U.S.C. § 343 (2006). Although it had not been used as such since the Great Depression,
during and after the crisis, the Fed seized upon this broad language that seemingly allows
it to lend to anybody without any realistic fear of judicial review. Steven M. Davidoff &
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN.
L. REV. 463, 477–78 (2009) (“This particular government action also set a precedent: it
was done . . . via the legal authority that would be used for each of the government’s ad
hoc bailouts . . . . For the legal authority to make this loan, the Federal Reserve relied
upon the broad language of its discount window authority . . . a law that was last invoked
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91

TARP represent far greater abdications of legislative responsibility
than Dodd-Frank. If the Bureau is indeed able to accomplish the
goals that led to its creation and prevent the future need to resort to
such dramatic programs, perhaps it should be seen as a positive even
to advocates of a revived nondelegation doctrine.
At the same time, however, if principles as supposedly fundamental as the nondelegation doctrine can be abandoned in times of crisis,
are they really fundamental at all? If the government itself can not be
expected to adhere to the “spirit of the law,” it seems unfair for it to
blame private enterprises for seeking regulatory loopholes as well. It
appears that in drafting the Act, Congress clearly did have an understanding of what type of statutes would and would not be struck down
by the Court as unconstitutional delegations of power; unfortunately,
it seems that they did not have an understanding of the real idea behind the nondelegation principle.

91

to the benefit of nonbanks in the Great Depression. . . . in administering the discount
window and providing assistance to banks, the Federal Reserve’s actions are effectively
removed from judicial review.”). All in all, the Fed used its discretion to make loans in an
amount of $3.3 trillion during the period from December 2007 to July 2010, and needless
to say, Congress played little role in guiding its discretion. Leo & Randall, supra note 16
(“The U.S. central bank on Wednesday disclosed details of some $3.3 trillion in loans
made to financial firms, companies and foreign central banks during the crisis.”).
TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, with a budget of $750 billion, to “purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as
are determined by the Secretary.” Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5211). The act provided little guidance to the Secretary, dictating, for example, that the
purchases be limited to those which he “determines promotes financial stability,” that the
Secretary “prevent unjust enrichment of financial institutions” and that he “take into consideration” nine equally indeterminate factors. Id. at §§ 3(9), 101(e), 103, 122 Stat. at
3767–68, 3770, (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Numerous scholars
have questioned the constitutionality of these actions. See e.g., Davidoff & Zaring, supra
note 90, at 516 (“The constitutional question most troublingly presented by the Paulson
draft [proposal for the TARP]—albeit less obviously by the congressional statutes that
elaborated Treasury’s responsibilities and that followed it—was whether the bill delegated
an unconstitutionally undefined amount of power to Treasury.”); Gary Lawson, Burying
the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 61 (2010) (“Even assuming
that Congress somehow has the power to turn the Treasury Department into a subsidiary
of Countrywide, the statutory authorization to the Treasury in TARP violates the constitutional nondelegation principle.”).
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IV. ELIZABETH WARREN & THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
Another example of the Administration’s failure to adhere to the
spirit of long-established constitutional doctrines is the appointment
without Senate approval of Elizabeth Warren as “Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.” While Warren has since resigned from this post and President Obama has nominated former
Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray to be the Bureau’s first Director, the issues raised by the initial appointment of Warren remain
92
significant. Exemplary of critics who have chastised the Administration for the exploitation of a constitutional loophole is Professor
Bruce Ackerman, who called the appointment “another milestone
down the path toward an imperial presidency” and has said that
“[d]uring America’s first 150 years, Ms. Warren’s appointment as a
93
special advisor to the White House would have been unthinkable.”
Much as Congress crafted Dodd-Frank to ensure that the Bureau
would not violate the black-letter rules of the non-delegation doctrine, President Obama has made sure not to violate any provision of
the Court’s Appointments Clause doctrine in his appointment of
Warren. As I will argue in this section, however, the appointment did
represent a significant deviation from the spirit of the Appointments
Clause, and is as great a cause of concern as the above-described nondelegation issues.
Before analyzing the appointment, I will begin this section in Part
A by summarizing the Court’s relevant Appointments Clause doctrines. In Part B, I will apply these doctrines to the appointment of
Warren. Specifically, I will argue in Part B that the undefined scope
of the powers granted to Warren during her tenure with the Bureau
is itself indicative of the Administration’s willingness to stray from the
spirit of the law. I will also argue in favor of an interpretation of the
Act that would have restricted Warren’s powers, and brought the appointment back within the confines of the law’s intent.
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93

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Treasury Department Announces Plans for Leadership Transition at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (July 26, 2011), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1258.aspx.
Bruce Ackerman, Obama, Warren and The Imperial Presidency, WALL STREET J., Sept. 22,
2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989304575503661726493580.
html.
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A. Summary of the Appointments Clause Doctrine
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution, commonly referred to as the Appointments Clause, reads in relevant part that:
[The President] shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
94
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

In accordance with this provision, the first step in assessing the constitutionality of the mechanism used to appoint an agency official is
determining whether the official is an “Officer of the United States.”
The Court in Buckley v. Valeo held that a person is such an officer if
they exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
95
States.” The Court made clear, however, that the term does not apply to employees of the United States who are “lesser functionaries
96
subordinate to officers of the United States.”
If it is determined that an official is an Officer of the United
States, the next step is determining whether he is a “principal” officer
or an “inferior” officer. If he is the former, Senate confirmation of
his appointment is required, and if he is the latter, Congress may vest
97
appointment power in the President. In Morrisson v. Olson the Court
acknowledged that the Founders provided little guidance as to where
to draw the line between these two categories. Rather than adopting
a bright line rule, the Court set out four criteria to provide guidance
to courts making such a determination, including: (1) whether the
officer is subject to removal by a higher official other than the President; (2) whether the scope of the office is limited in duties; (3)
whether the scope of the office is limited in jurisdiction; and (4)
98
whether the length of the officer’s tenure is limited in time. In Edmond v. United States the Court emphasized that it is the first of these
99
four factors that is the most important.
94
95
96
97

98
99



U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 126 n.162.
See id. at 132 (“Principal officers are selected by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. Inferior officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President
alone . . . .”).
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (discussing the factors which determined whether the appellant is an inferior officer).
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (“Generally speaking, the term
‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers be-
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B. Application of the Doctrine to the Warren Appointment
Turning now to the application of this doctrine to the Bureau, it
seems clear that since the Director has vast investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers, and is removable by the President only
for cause, that he qualifies as a principle “Officer of the United
States.” What is more questionable, however, is whether Warren was
also such an officer. In this section I separate the analysis of this
question into two parts. In the first, I will attempt to identify the
scope of the powers that were granted to Warren, and suggest that
there are two general possibilities for what they included. I will conclude that the undefined nature of these powers is itself indicative of
the Administration’s willingness to stray from the spirit of the law. In
the second part, I will analogize the appointment to the issuance of
an executive order and argue in favor of an interpretation of the Act
that would have restricted Warren’s powers, and brought the appointment back within the confines of the law’s intent.
1. Identifying the Scope of Warren’s Powers
Before deciding whether the appointment of Warren should have
been subject to Senate confirmation, we must determine the scope of
Warren’s powers. While one can look back on Warren’s tenure and
examine what powers she actually exercised, the relevant question for
our analysis is determining what powers she was legally authorized to exercise. Unfortunately, however, the Administration has provided little
guidance for this inquiry. The White House press release announcing the appointment said only that “Professor Warren has been a
pioneer on the issues before the Consumer Financial Protection Bu100
reau, and she will now help lead the effort to stand up the agency.”
The Bureau website, while providing a bullet point list of jobs that the
“Implementation Team” is “hard at work on,” also failed to define the
101
outer limits of Warren’s powers. This being the case, we must turn

100

101



low the President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.”).
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Names Elizabeth Warren Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Sep. 17, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/17/president-obama-nameselizabeth-warren-assistant-president-and-special-a.
Specifically, the Bureau website provides that the Bureau is “hard at work”: (1)
“[m]eeting with consumer groups and financial services companies to ensure the consumer bureau’s work targets real problems people encounter in the marketplace;” (2)
“[s]etting up and training the teams that will be responsible for supervising and enforc-
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to the text of the Act to speculate on what these powers may have included.
Some have suggested that Warren’s position was akin to that of an
“interim Director,” a position explicitly created in the Act and filled
by the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 1066 of the Act authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury “to perform the functions of the Bureau
under . . . subtitle [F] until the Director of the Bureau is confirmed
102
by the Senate.” If Warren was indeed intended to have been some
sort of interim Director, her powers would presumably have been the
same as those temporarily granted by the Act to the Secretary. Unfortunately, however, this only leads to another question: What are the
powers of the Secretary? There seem to be two different answers to
this question depending on how the Subtitle is interpreted.
Subtitle F is, in summary, the section of the Act that describes the
“transitional provisions” for the Bureau. The subtitle provides a definition of “consumer financial protection functions,” including au103
thority to promulgate rules, and dictates that these should be transferred from various other agencies to the Bureau by a designated
104
transfer date. Not later than this date, which occurred on July 21,
2011, the Bureau “shall, after consultation with the head of each
transferor agency, identify the rules and orders that will be enforced
105
by the Bureau.” The Subtitle also directs the Bureau and the heads
of various other agencies to identify employees who are to be trans106
ferred to the Bureau. Under one interpretation of the Subtitle, the
power of the Secretary of the Treasury is limited to these transitional
functions. While the Secretary could lay the groundwork for future
rulemaking proceedings, the agency would be unable to promulgate
any legally enforceable new rules. Although some might argue that

102
103
104
105
106

ing Federal consumer financial laws;” (3) “[l]aying the groundwork to enforce Federal
consumer financial laws and to write new rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act;” (4)
“[d]eveloping a website for complaints and toll-free hotline for consumers;” and (5)
“[p]reparing to open offices to assist specific groups of consumers, including offices for
Servicemember Affairs and Financial Protection for Older Americans, as specifically required under the Dodd-Frank Act.” Consumer Finance Protection Bureau,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau (last visited July 11, 2011). For an additional source containing this list, see Consumer Financial Protection BUREAU, U.S.
DEPARTMENT
OF
THE
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/budgetperformance/Documents/CJ_FY2012_CFPB_508.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2011).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1066, 124 Stat. at 2055
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5586).
Id. at § 1061(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2035 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5581).
Id. at § 1062, 124 Stat. at 2039 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5582).
Id. at § 1063(i)(1), 124 Stat. at 2043 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5583).
Id. at § 1064, 124 Stat. at 2043 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 55841).
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granting even this authority to Warren would have been unconstitutional, it seems at least relatively unproblematic if the Secretary had
final say.
It is under the second interpretation of the Subtitle that things
look particularly troubling. Specifically, under this interpretation,
the Secretary would not only have the authority to identify rules and
orders to be enforced by the Bureau, but also the authority to begin
executing the “consumer financial protection functions” transferred
to the Bureau—most significantly, initiating new rulemaking pro107
ceedings. Support for this interpretation can be found in National
Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, where the D.C. Circuit held that when
an agency’s organic statute contains a grant of rulemaking authority,
the agency’s expansive interpretation of the ambiguous scope of the
authority should receive deference if the disputed rulemaking func108
tion would be effective at furthering the purposes of the statue.
Specifically, the court upheld the Federal Trade Commission’s authority to promulgate substantive legislative rules to enforce its
mandate to prevent “unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,” despite the
fact that the agency itself did not assert the power to promulgate such
rules until forty-eight years after its founding, and had “indicated in109
termittently before that time that it lacked such power.”
Analogous to the Federal Trade Commission Act, Dodd-Frank
confers a broad grant of rule-making to the Bureau, and Subtitle F
contains no specific limitation on this rulemaking authority prior to
the confirmation by the Senate of a permanent Director. As such, it
is entirely plausible that a court could interpret the statute to allow
the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate rules. Even if Warren
would have had to defer final authority to the Secretary, it is possible
107

108

109

This second interpretation includes the possibility of the Secretary only having power to
promulgate rules enforcing those laws the enforcement of which were transferred to the
Bureau from other agencies (as opposed to laws created by the Act and specifically allocated to the Bureau). It also includes the possibility of the Secretary only being authorized to promulgate rules enforceable against financial institutions (as opposed to rules
also enforceable against those nonfinancial institutions coming within the Bureau’s jurisdiction).
482 F.2d 672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“Ambiguous legislative history cannot change the express legislative intent. The Commission is using rule-making to carry out what the Congress agreed was among its central purposes: expedited administrative enforcement of
the national policy against monopolies and unfair business practices. Under the circumstances, since Section 6(g) plainly authorizes rule-making and nothing in the statute or in
its legislative history precludes its use for this purpose, the action of the Commission must
be upheld.”).
Id.
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that she would have had substantial influence on the content of any
promulgated rules.
Unfortunately, the administration failed to provide any clear description of how it would interpret the Act. When asked by Senator
Robert Corker if he believed the Bureau had rulemaking authority
before the confirmation of a Director, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Neal Wolin, responded only vaguely, saying “I think there is limited rule-writing authority, but it is constrained until such time as
110
there is a confirmed Director.”
When asked to elaborate whether
there is rulemaking authority before the designated transfer date,
Wolin again provided only a squeamish answer, saying “I think the
111
rulemaking authority is circumscribed.”
As indicated by National Petroleum Refiners, even if Wolin at one
time asserted that that there is only limited rulemaking authority, this
does not weigh negatively on allowing him to change his mind. Regardless of whether the Bureau eventually decides that it will or will
not promulgate rules before the confirmation of a permanent Director, it is the lack of clarity by the Administration on the role of Warren and the powers of the Bureau that suggests that they are willing
to divert from the spirit of the law if necessary.
2. Executive Orders: An Analogy in Support of the Restriction of
Warren’s Powers
No matter how detailed or intricate a legal doctrine is, it is nearly
impossible for a court to articulate one that, if followed, would simultaneously prevent all possible exploitations of the law. Even without
the formal appointment of Warren, there is nothing that could have
stopped the President from unofficially soliciting her advice and forc112
ing it upon his Treasury Secretary. After all, if the Secretary refused
to obey such an order the President could threaten him with removal
from his post. Nevertheless, it seems that there should be some legal
mechanism to prevent the more formal appointment of an advisor
who is charged with duties identical to those Congress has meant to
110

111
112

Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of
Neal S. Wolin, U.S., Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
Id. at 30.
See e.g., Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law or
Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 645–46 (2010) (arguing that “any theoretical difference between influence and control, or between oversight and decision, will not be observed in practice . . . . [T]he two extremes themselves are, practically speaking, indistinguishable. One person’s ‘oversight’ will be another person’s ‘decision’”).
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delegate to a Senate-confirmed appointee. One theoretical way in
which a limitation on the authority of such an advisor can be envisioned is by analogizing the advisor’s appointment and influence to
that of an executive order. If the President would be unable to control the Bureau centrally through the use of executive orders forcing
the Secretary of the Treasury to follow his instructions, he also should
not be able to usurp the Bureau through the use of an official advisor
like Ms. Warren.
For the present purposes, let us adopt the views of the Court’s
newest member, Elena Kagan, regarding the authority of the President to issue binding executive orders. Under the view of Justice Kagan, the fact that the Court has allowed for Congress to place restrictions on the President’s ability to remove an agency head implies that
“it can advance the same end by barring the President from imposing
113
his policy choices on them.”
According to Kagan, the President
generally has authority to issue a binding executive order on an
agency head if Congress has allowed the President to remove the official without cause, and generally does not if Congress has prohibited
114
such removal.
Although it is possible for Congress to mix-andmatch executive order authority with varied removal restrictions to
the extent that the combination does not impede the President’s duty
115
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” since Congress
does not tend to be explicit on such matters, courts should adopt the
116
above rule of statutory interpretation.
There is a peculiar problem, however, with applying this rule to
Dodd-Frank; although the permanent Director of the Bureau is removable only for cause, there is no such restriction on the removal of
the interim Director, who is a cabinet official removable at the President’s whim. The rule’s application would imply that the President
113
114
115

116

Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2323 (2001).
Id. at 2327–28.
Id. (“[E]ven if Congress has not . . . [chosen to insulate an official from the President’s atwill removal authority], it should be able, as an alternate means of ensuring a measure of
independence, to limit the President’s directive authority . . . .”). But see id. at 2323 n.306
(“It is possible to argue . . . that Congress must choose between limiting the President’s
removal power and giving him plenary control over administrative officials . . . .”).
Id. at 2326–27 (“If Congress, in a particular statute, has stated its intent with respect to
presidential involvement, then that is the end of the matter. But, if Congress, as it usually
does, simply has assigned discretionary authority to an agency official, without in any way
commenting on the President’s role in the delegation, then an interpretive question arises. . . . When the delegation in question runs to members of an independent agency . . . .
Congress has acted . . . to insulate agency decisionmaking from the President’s influence. . . . When the delegation runs to an executive branch official, however, Congress’s
intent . . . may well cut in the opposite direction.”).
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will have executive order authority before the confirmation of a permanent Director, but will not have such authority thereafter. If this
were indeed the case, the President would have no incentive to appoint a permanent Director, for it would result in him abdicating his
power to influence the Bureau—a situation clearly outside the conceivable realm of Congressional intent. As such, the Act seems to
present an instance where Justice Kagan’s rule of interpretation is inapplicable, and the ability of the President to remove the interim
head of the agency should not be viewed as also enabling him to issue
a binding executive order on the Bureau. Completing the analogy,
the President should also not have authority to make an appointment, the effect of which would be to control the interim Director of
the Bureau.
To avoid the problems implicated by this second suggested construction of the Act, granting the Treasury Secretary the authority to
execute the “consumer financial protection functions” transferred to
the Bureau, I recommend that any reviewing court should instead follow the first suggested interpretation, limiting the Secretary to the
less worrisome transitional powers described above. While even this
may not quell the worries of all constitutional scholars, it at least in
some way limits the influence that a nonelected official can have on
issues of national regulatory policy without the confirmation of the
Senate. Had the Administration been clearer about its intent in appointing a “special advisor,” however, such worries may never have
arisen in the first place.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has been envisioned by some to be the “first truly 21st century regulatory agency”—
one that “will be engaged with the community and make use of new
technology to gather data quickly and put it to use immediately to
117
protect consumers.” Although the goals of the Bureau may well set
a healthy precedent for the country’s regulatory agenda moving forward in the century, the manner of the Bureau’s conception and the
early stages of its life certainly portend trouble for some of administrative law’s longest established principles. While Congress and the
Administration have been careful to stay within the bounds of the
Court’s nondelegation and Appointments clause doctrines—
117

Preeti Vissa, Face-to-Face With Elizabeth Warren: Envisioning a 21st Century Consumer Agency
for All Americans, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
preeti-vissa/facetoface-with-elizabeth_b_778396.html.
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explicitly providing standards and objectives for the Bureau’s rulemaking, and naming Elizabeth Warren as “Special Assistant” rather
than an “interim Director”—it appears, unfortunately, that they have
not had equal regard for the motivating spirit behind these laws. As
stated at the outset of this Comment, courts are inherently limited in
their ability to articulate doctrines that fully capture this spirit, and as
such, the public must be able to trust that its elected officials will endeavor to act in accordance with the broader purposes of the law rather than a court’s mere statement of it. If the Bureau is indeed the
prototype of the twenty-first century agency, it seems that this relationship of trust is in dire need of rehabilitation.

